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A SHORT  
V I E W  
OF THE  
State of AFFAIRS,  
With RELATION to  
*GREAT BRITAIN,*  
FOR  
*Four Years past ;*  
WITH SOME  
R E M A R K S  
O N

The TREATY lately Published and a *Pamphlet*  
intituled, OBSERVATIONS upon it.

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
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## SHORT VIEW

O F T H E

State of AFFAIRS,

With Relation to

*Great Britain, &c.*


 Pamphlet having been lately published, by Mr. *Buckley*, intituled, *A Treaty of Peace, Union, Friendship and mutual Defence between the Crowns of Great Britain, France and Spain, &c.* it cannot be improper nor unseasonable to take a short View of the State of Affairs, with Relation to *Great Britain*, for *some Years past*, and the Prospect, which *this Treaty* gives us for the *Time to come*:

In the Year 1724, his late Majesty was pleased to assure us, from the Throne, that We had *Peace with ALL POWERS Abroad*; and we were, in particular, so far from having any Contests or Disputes with the *Emperor* and the *King of Spain*, as to all outward Appearance at that Time, that We were made *Mediators* between them, at the Congress

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of *Cambray*, in Conjunction with *France*; but immediately after this, the Face of Affairs was entirely changed, by the Conclusion of the *Treaty of Vienna*; which gave our *Ministers* such dreadful Apprehensions of some *secret Designs* against the Interest of *Great Britain*, that it induced them to project a *Counter Alliance*, called the *Hanover Treaty*, to oppose the Machinations of these *new Allies* and prevent the Execution of their *Schemes*.

The *secret Motives* to this *sudden, unaccountable* and *formidable Union* (as it was stiled in the *Enquiry*) between the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* was canvassed very largely, last Winter, by the Gentlemen concerned in the *Craftsman* and his *Opponents*; and I think it was demonstratively proved, by the *former*, that the *sending back the Infanta* was the *immediate Cause*, with Relation to *France*, which *threw the King of Spain into the Arms of the Emperor*; and that our *Refusal to accept of the sole Mediation*, upon this Occurrence, out of Complaisance to our good Allies the *French*, was one *accessory Cause* of it; as *another* might be our *Refusal to deliver up the Fortrefs of Gibraltar into the Hands of the Spaniards*, in Pursuance of a *positive Engagement*, as they pretended, and a *Promise*, founded on a *LETTER* from his late Majesty to the King of *Spain*; which hath been since fully explained to the World.

The *Emperor* might likewise have some *private Reasons* for accepting this Offer from *Spain*, besides those *advantageous Terms*, which were proposed to Him, and have been so much exaggerated.

But whatever might be the *secret Springs* of this *Alliance*, the open and profess'd Motives to the Project of the *Treaty of Hanover*, were the *secret Articles*, which the *Treaty of Vienna* was said to contain; and these indeed were the *only reasonable and justifiable*



*justifiable* Motives, which could engage our *Ministers* in it; for a *meer Union* between the *Emperor* and *Spain* was not, of itself, of so *formidable* a Nature, as it hath been represented. They might have concluded a *Treaty of Peace*, or *Commerce* or *mutual Defence*, as all Nations have a Right to do, without giving any reasonable Ground of *Resentment* or *Apprehension*. Nay We might have safely acceded to *such a Treaty*, as We were *invited* to do. But it was the *secret, offensive Treaty*, which raised our Indignation, alarmed our Fears, and put us upon our Guard. For this Reason the Author of the *Enquiry* employ'd all his Strength to prove that there really was such a *secret Treaty*; and He seem'd to be as positive as if He had been present at the *signing* of it, that the *following Articles* were contain'd in it, *viz.* 1<sup>st</sup>, That the King of *Spain* had entered into an Engagement to support his *Imperial Majesty* by Force of Arms, in carrying on a Trade from *Ostend* to the *East-Indies*, in Violation of *Treaties*, as it was alledged; and had given him greater Privileges of Trade in the *West-Indies* than to the *English*. 2<sup>dly</sup>, That his *Imperial Majesty* had taken a like Engagement to assist the King of *Spain* in endeavouring to wrest *Gibraltar* out of our Hands. 3<sup>dly</sup>, That they had Both jointly engaged to make an Attempt in Favour of the *Pretender*, and to set Him upon the Throne of *Great Britain*. 4<sup>thly</sup>, That a Marriage was agreed upon between the Infant *Don Carlos* and the *eldest Caroline Arch-Duchess*, which threaten'd *Europe* with *universal Monarchy*.

These were the *secret Engagements*, which gave Occasion to the *Treaty of Hanover*, and upon which the *Expediency* of it and the Conduct of our *Ministers* hath been justified both *within Doors* and *without*.

Indeed

Indeed this *secret, offensive Treaty* and the *Articles*, supposed to be contained in it, were immediately and very strenuously denied by the contracting Parties in the *Treaty of Vienna*; particularly *That* of endeavouring to set the *Pretender* on the *British Throne*; which the *Emperor* ordered his Minister to declare, upon his *Imperial Word*, to be intirely *without Foundation*; but the *Emperor* is a *Papist*, as the Author of the *Enquiry* very justly observed; and therefore his *Word* could not be of equal Validity with the learned Arguments of a good, *Protestant Writer*, or the solemn Assseveration of a *Protestant Minister*. I speak this with all due Deference to our *French Allies*; who, though *Papists* in *Principle*, have been found to be thoroughly *Protestant* in their *Practices*.

It must be confessed likewise that whatever might be the Engagements of this *secret, offensive Treaty*, (which was never yet *brought to Light*) there does not seem to be the least Proof (I mean, besides the *Arguments* and *Assseverations* before-mentioned) that the *Emperor* gave his *Catholick Majesty* any Assistance, during the Siege of *Gibraltar*; or that his *Catholick Majesty*, on the other Hand, supported the *Emperor* in his Project for carrying on a Trade from *Ostend*; or gave Him any Privileges of Commerce in the *West-Indies*, superiour to what had been granted to the *English*; or that there ever was any Design of a Marriage between *Don Carlos* and the *eldest Archdutchess of Austria*—But these are *Postulata*, which We are obliged and every good *Englishman* will be ready to grant for the Justification of those wise and steady Measures, which our Ministers have so gloriously pursued, for several Years past.

Great Pains have been taken on both Sides to throw the Occasion of our late unhappy Disturbances upon each other. The clandestine Manner,

In which the *Defensive Treaty* of Vienna was carried on, without communicating it to the Court of *Great Britain*, was made a principal Argument, in the *Enquiry*, that there must be a *secret, offensive Treaty*. On the other Hand, the *Imperialists* have endeavoured to throw the *Odium* back upon us; and alledg'd, in their Excuse for this *private Way of Treating*, that We gave the *first Umbrage* and set them an *Example* for it, by concluding a *private Treaty* at *Madrid*, whilst We were under the Circumstances of *Mediators* between *that Court* and *Vienna*——But *This* also is a very nice and curious Question, which I shall not take upon me to determine.

Without enquiring therefore any farther into the Grounds and Reasons of these *two great Alliances*, let us consider what have been the *Consequences* of them; and here I think, there can be no Room for Dispute; since whatever might be the *Motives* to the *Treaty of Vienna* or the *secret Designs* of it, the Conclusion of a *Treaty with France*, in opposition to it, was certainly the Occasion of widening our Differences with *Spain* and engaged us in *those Measures* (both *Hostile* and *Pacifick*) which have been since taken.

*Three large Squadrons of Ships of War* were immediately equipp'd, at a vast Expence, and sent into the *Baltick*, the *Mediterranean* and the *West Indies*. The Commander of the *last* had ever memorable Orders to lie before *Portobello*, and block up the *Galleons* which were then coming Home, and even to use *Persuasive Force*, in order to possess himself not only of *Them*, but likewise of the *Flotilla*, which lay at *la Vera Cruz*, some thousand Miles off; but the *Spaniards* not being so complaisant as to put themselves in his Power, He continued  
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upon that unwholesome Station 'till his Ships were almost destroy'd by the *Worm*, his Provisions spent and his Men perish'd, by Thousands, in the most miserable Manner. Nor was *This* all. The King of *Spain* looked upon this Procedure as an Act of *Hostility* and retented it accordingly, by laying a vigorous Siege to *Gibraltar*; and it hath been made a Doubt whether our *Allies* did not view it in the *same Light*; for though it was stipulated, in the *Treaty of Hanover*, that the contracting Parties should assist and support each other, in Case their Dominions were *attack'd*; though We had frequent Assurances given us, by a *certain Gentleman*, that the *French* would make the Siege of *Gibraltar* a *Casus Fæderis*, and were ready to march a large Army into *Roussillon*, to divert that Design or oblige the *Spaniards* to raise it; yet, I say, nothing of all this was done. The Siege continued several Months; and as the *Emperor* did not assist the King of *Spain*, in *carrying it on*, as the *Author of the Enquiry* told us he had engaged to do; so neither did the Court of *France* move a Man to our Assistance in the *Defence* of it, as *one of the Patrons* of the *Enquiry* assured us they would; but they observed an exact *Neutrality*, *at most*, and sat unconcern'd Spectators of our *Danger* and *Expence*.

I cannot forbear observing, in this Place, that though these *extraordinary, naval Armaments* and *Expeditions* were look'd upon as *Hostilities* by the *Spaniards* and produced a Return of *Hostilities* upon *Us*; yet they did not answer the End, which *farther Hostilities* would very probably have done; and at the same Time gave our *Allies* an Opportunity of withholding their *Assistance*, by opening a Dispute whether we were not the *Aggressors*;

*Aggressors*; for in that Case, they were not obliged to assist us, by Virtue of an *Alliance*, which was *Defensive only*. Thus we had the Misfortune to do enough to provoke the *Spaniards* to *Hostilities*, but not enough to bring them to a *Compliance with our Terms*.

Our *Land Forces* were considerably augmented upon the same Account. Our *Taxes* were of Consequence increased; and our *National Debts* were so far from being *reduced* in such a Degree, as they might otherwise have been, that instead of discharging a great Part of them which we could have done, we have been incurring a large Debt, which we need not have done.

In the mean Time, our *Trade* decay'd in every Part of it, and dwindled away almost to nothing in some of its most beneficial Branches, our *Manufactures* declin'd, and our Merchants sustained insupportable Losses; their Ships being taken without Number in the *West-Indies*, the *Ocean* and even in our *own Channel*, having no *Convoys* to guard them, and no *Letters of Reprizal* granted to make themselves Satisfaction.

At length, *Preliminaries* were agreed upon for a general Pacification; which were signed at *Paris*, on the 20th--31st of *May*, 1727, by the Ministers Plenipotentiary of his *Imperial Majesty*, his *Britannick Majesty*, the *most Christian King*, and the *States General*; and on the 2d--13th of the next Month they were sign'd at *Vienna* by the Minister of his *Catholick Majesty*; that is, *above Two Years and an half ago*.

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By *this Convention* it was stipulated that within the Space of *four Months* after these Articles were signed, a *Congress* should be open'd, in which all the *Rights* and *Pretensions* of the contracting Powers should be examin'd, discuss'd and determin'd; and that the several Powers should earnestly injoin their respective *Plenipotentiaries* to avoid all *Obstructions* or *Embarrassments*, which might in any Manner *protract* or *disturb* the *Congress*.

But the *Preliminaries* were no sooner signed, than new *Difficulties* and *Disputes* were started concerning the *Meaning* of them; particularly with regard to *Those Articles*, which affected *Great Britain*; such as the raising the *Siege* of *Gibraltar* and releasing the Ship *Prince Frederick*, as well as the other Ships taken by the *Spaniards*. His *Catholick Majesty* insisted that a meer *Suspension of Arms*, stipulated by the *Preliminaries*, did not imply an *actual Raising of the Siege*; and [that the *Restitution* of the Ship *Prince Frederick* was not mentioned or included in them; whereas we demanded both, by *Virtue of those Articles*. The Court of *Spain* insisted likewise on an *Indulto* of 20 per Cent upon the *Effects* of *private Persons*, embark'd in the *Flotilla*, contrary to the 5th *Preliminary Article*, as it was alledged on our *Part*.

After these *new Disputes* had been agitated, with great Warmth, for several Months, they were adjusted by another *Convention*, negotiated by the Count *de Rottembourg*, Minister of *France* at the Court of *Spain* and sign'd at the *Pardo*

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on March the 6th, 1728. By this Convention the *Præliminaries* were *new model'd* and it was again agreed that *all the respective Pretensions on each Side should be produced, debated and decided in the Congress.* Upon this the King of Spain agreed to the *Ratification* of the *Præliminaries*; but this was no sooner done than still *other fresh Difficulties* arose, concerning the *Orders*, which were agreed on both Sides, to be sent to the *West Indies*, in Pursuance of this *Act of Ratification*; but at length *these Difficulties* were likewise got over, for the Present, and the *Congress* was open'd at *Soissons* on the 3d—14th of *June 1728*, above eight Months after the Time that was stipulated by the *Præliminaries*.

It is necessary to observe here again that, during all these Negotiations, We had no *Minister* at the Court of *Spain*, but depended on the good Offices of *M. Vandermeer* and the *Count de Rottembourg*, who managed all our Affairs; and I have been told that *one* of them did not act his Part intirely to our *Satisfaction*.

However, this Point of the *Congress* being at last obtained, after a tedious Course of *Negotiation* and *Sollicitation*, attended with various *Schemes*, *Projects* and *Conventions*, We had the strongest Assurances given us that our Affairs would be now brought to a *speedy and happy Accommodation*; that our *Trade* would be secured, for the future, on a *firm and solid Foundation*; that our *unfortunate, suffering Merchants* would receive ample Satisfaction for all their *past Losses*; and that the *Affair of Gibraltar and Portmahon*, which had given us so much *Uneasiness*, would not be so much as men-

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tioned in the Congress — But what was the Event? The Plenipotentiaries assembled in Form and having spent five or six Months in Ceremonies, and Compliments to Cardinal Fleury, as well as Entertainments, Balls, Hunting-Matches and other Diversions, they broke up and returned to their respective Courts, without settling any material Point towards the general Pacification, so long promised and desired.

Indeed a Project, call'd a *Provisional Treaty*, was concerted by the *Allies of Hanover*, and laid before the World last Winter, with pompous OBSERVATIONS upon it; in which the great Wisdom of *that Scheme* was explained and Hopes were given us that their *Imperial and Catholick Majesties* would accede to it. But as *this Project* was far from giving a general Satisfaction at Home, so neither was it ever accepted by *Those Powers Abroad*. On the contrary the *main Business* of the Parliament was no sooner got over, than Affairs seem'd again to be tending to a Rupture. The Conferences at *Soissons* continued suspended, and *military Preparations* were renewed in most Parts of Europe; particularly at SPITHEAD, where a *powerful, united Fleet* of *English and Dutch* Ships of War assembled together in a very formidable Figure, as if design'd for some *great Enterprize* of the last Importance; but having lain there at Anchor, for the whole Summer, in a very peaceable and hospitable Manner, for the Reception and Entertainment of all *Visitors* (whose Curiosity to view so fine a Sight drew them thither from all Parts of the Kingdom) they separated at last, without committing one *Act of Hostility*, and returned in Safety to their respective Harbours.

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The Continuance of this *pacifick Armada* at *Spithead*, for so many Months together, hath given some People an Handle to suggest that *one of our Allies* hath received some Assurances of Satisfaction for their extraordinary Expence on this Occasion; and that our *military Genius* was restrained from any *hostile Exploits* by the prevailing Influence of the *other*. They go farther and alledge that the *Dutch Squadron*, which join'd *ours*, was not originally designed for *that Service*. They tell us, with great Assurance, that they were equipped to prevent the Designs of his *Danish Majesty*, with Respect to the *Altena Company*; and that *That Affair* being made easy for the Present, We prevail'd upon them, by our *persuasive Influence*, to make a Figure with *us* at *Spithead*; but that they had no Orders to sail *any farther*, supposing we had been in a *fighting Humour*, being neither *viſtualled* nor otherwise *provided* for any Expedition; but I make no Doubt that these Suggestions will be soon proved groundless, in a *proper Place*, and that the Equipment and Disposition of *this Fleet* will appear to be *wise, prudent and necessary*,

It hath been however our *peculiar Misfortune* that, during all this Time, whilst our *Expences* and *Taxes* have run very high, our *Commerce* hath been grievously interrupted in its most valuable Branches; not only by the continued Depredations of the *Spaniards* on our Merchants in the *West Indies*, but likewise by a very strict *Embargo*, which it was thought expedient to lay, for *above Two Months together*, on all Ships bound from *Jamaica* and *Virginia*, on some Apprehensions, as it is said, of a Descent from the *Spaniards*. I call *this a peculiar*

*peculiar Misfortune to us*, because our *Allies* have not lain under the *same Disadvantages* in their *Trade* and the Consumption of their *Manufactures*; but, on the contrary, have reap'd a very great *Benefit* from our *Misfortunes*; especially the *French*; who brought their *Sugars, Tobacco*, and other *American Commodities* to a much better Market in *Europe*, by the *Restraint*, which was continued so long on our *Shipping* in those Parts.

But it will be asked, perhaps, why I dwell so long on this melancholy Side of our Case; and do not rather congratulate my Countrymen on that *happy Turn*, which the *Treaty*, lately concluded, hath given to our Affairs? My Answer to this is, that I thought it necessary to take a short Review of our Affairs *for some Years back*; to consider how *these Troubles were brought upon us*; what we have suffered by them; and what kind of *Treatment we have already met with*; in order to form a right Judgment on our *present Condition* and our *future Prospect*.

I might also make a Doubt whether the *Treaty* (lately published by Mr. *Buckley*) is the *genuine Treaty* concluded at *Seville*, because it does not appear to be published by *Authority*; at least, whether *all the Articles* are contained in it; which, I confess, seems very improbable, for several Reasons, which I may hereafter mention.

However, I will just take a short View of it (as it is given us) and see whether it contains all those *good Things*, which have been so often promis'd and we have so much Reason to expect after all our heavy *Losses* and *extraordinary Expences*.

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Such an Examination is the more necessary at present, because the Publication of *this Treaty* was immediately follow'd, according to *annual Custom*, with *ridiculous Observations* upon it, calculated to impose upon the World, by straining it to a Sense, which the Words will not bear, and could not possibly be intended by the *contrasting Parties*.

But before I examine these *Observations*, I must beg Leave to make some Remarks on the *Introduction* to them.

This Method of *wiredrawing* and *refining Treaties*, in opposition to their *natural Construction* and the *true Design* of them, hath been too much practis'd of late, for *certain Purposes*, which are no Secrets to the World; and I confess that it hath always given me a strong Suspicion of *Inability* or *bad Designs*, when there is any Occasion for *Explications* and *Refinements* of this Nature; for as *plain Terms* are always more ready than *ambiguous* and *equivocal ones*, They will always be preferr'd by Men of *Understanding* and *Integrity*, who will never suffer Themselves to be impos'd upon, nor endeavour to impose upon their Country by *Words*, which are liable to *eternal Cavils* and *Disputes*.

*These anniversary Writers* have often put me in Mind of the *French Mountebank*, mention'd by Mr. *Addison*, who had always a little Boy running before Him through the Streets of *Paris*, and crying, *my Father cures all Sorts of Distempers*; to which the *Doctor* replied with a grave Voice, *The Child speaks Truth*—Charlatans in *Politicks* must have their *Zanics*

nies and *Merry-Andrews* as well as *other Quacks*; but as a *certain great Doctor* hath sent his *Children* before Him, without any Success, for some Years past, He hath thought fit, at last, to *speak for Himself* and be the *Trumpeter of his own Fame*.

If these *Political Commentators* could persuade foreign Princes to understand *Treaties* in the *Sense*, which They are pleased to put upon them, it would be a real Service to their Country; but the Case is quite otherwise, and their *Explanations* have been hitherto constantly disowned by the *Powers Abroad*, as soon as They have served the *Purposes*, for which they were intended *at Home*; and this hath often had a *double ill Effect*; for as it gives us the Character of *awkard Tricksters* in *foreign Courts*, so it always makes us uneasy and diffident *at home*, when We find ourselves disappointed and deluded into *false Expectations*.

This is too evident from what hath been observed upon the *Treaties* and *Conventions* before-mention'd; and I wish it may not be verified in the *present Treaty* and the *Comment* now before us; upon which I shall take the Liberty of making some Remarks, without being in the least affected with the *Scurrility* of the Author, who seems to have the Vanity to think that his *insolent Reflections* and *dogmatical Assertions* will preclude all *farther Examination*, and deter others from *contradicting* what He lays down, He might as well have said, *Pray, Gentlemen, read over these Articles and confess what a glorious Peace I have procured for you. It is sufficient, Gentlemen, that I say it; and if you offer to be of another Opinion, it is a plain Sign that you are no better than Jacobites and Papists in your Hearts.*

It seems very extraordinary that *this Gentleman* should think proper to justify this *Treaty*, before any *Objections* had been published against it; for though He is pleas'd to say that *some People have taken Pains to discredit it, even before they had seen it*; I confess I am at a Loss to guess *whom* He means. I am sure *those Writers*, with whom He seems to be so very angry, have purposely declined any Animadversions upon it, though they might perhaps have been apprized of some of the *Articles*, till it was published by *Authority*; and I hope a Man of his *Importance* would not condescend to turn *Pamphleteer* and waste so much of his precious Time in answering the private Whispers of *Coffee-house Politicians*.

His great Officiousness therefore in having the *first Word* and answering *Objections*, before they are made, looks as if He was conscious to Himself that the *Peace* was not found at the Bottom, and stood in need of some *Explanation* to support it. But how hath He attempted to vindicate it? Why, by celebrating his *own excellent Conduct* and abusing *some particular Gentlemen*, whom He is pleas'd not to like, in so *licentious* a Manner, that nothing can add to his *Vanity* and *Insolence*, but endeavouring, by his Interest in *any Place*, or in *any Manner*, to prohibit the same Freedom of writing on the *other Side*.

I hope that He will have so much Modesty at least, as not to make any such Attempt after *this*; and I think it a very seasonable Opportunity to put the World in mind of the great Usefulness of the *Liberty of the Press*; for if any *Restraint* should be laid upon it, by *his Means*, (and I believe

lieve no *other Man* will ever attempt it) they cannot expect any Accounts of *political Affairs*, of any Kind whatsoever, besides such *partial* and *scandalous Glosses* as that, which is now before us.

The *Observer* seems very unhappy, at his first setting out, in the Description he gives of *those Men*, who, as he supposes, will find Fault with *this Treaty*. He tells us *they are like those Wretches that live upon dangerous Coasts, whose Profit arises from Wrecks; who subsist by the Misfortunes and Calamities of his Fellow Creatures; and whose Affliction is consequently an happy Presage of Calm and Serenity*. I say this Description does not seem to suit *Those*, to whom he applies it, so well as it does a *great, overgrown, wicked Minister*, who hath enrich'd himself by the *Spoils of a Nation*; whose Power subsists by the *Misfortunes and Calamities* of his Fellow Subjects; and whose *Dowry* would consequently be an happy Omen of the *Prosperity of his Country*.

He insinuates, afterwards, that the Arguments of these *wicked Men*, his *Opposers*, have made no small Impression at the Court of *Madrid*. How strange and, at the same Time, how melancholy a Consideration is it, that such a *mean, inconsiderable and despicable Faction*, as They have been often represented, should have any Influence in *foreign Courts*, or be able to give the least Obstruction to *Him* and his *Associates* in their *wise and notable Negotiations*?

He is likewise full of his Apprehensions that the *Suggestions* of this same *mean and inconsiderable Cabal*

*bal* will have some Influence on the Counfels of *Vienna*, and fays *We may moft certainly expect that They will now apply their whole Skill and Invention to find out fuch Reafons as may beft ferve to divert his Imperial Majefty from becoming a Party to thefe Engagements.*

Now, in my humble Opinion, this Work is already done to their Hands by the *Observer* Himfelf, who hath furnifh'd his *Imperial Majefty*, in this very Pamphlet, with ample Reafons for not acceding to the *Treaty*, as I fhall prefently fhew; and, in the mean Time, I will leave the Reader to judge whether charging fo great a Prince with *Ingratitude* and *Breach of Faith* (as this *Writer* does by a very ftrong Implication) is the moft probable Method of making Him our *Friend*.

He cannot forget furely how fuch Ufage, from *Him* and *his Creatures*, upon all Occafions, was refented at *Vienna* fome Years ago. Nay, He feem'd to be fenfible of it laft Winter, and began to foften his Language towards *that Court*, and beftow'd the fame Kind of Rhetorick on their *Catholic Majefties*; but now, it feems, Things have taken *another Turn*, by his *wife* and *fteady Meafures*, and the *Emperor* muft fubmit to be *abused*, in the fame Manner, again.

But to return—The Reafons of his Apprehenfions that this *little, powerful Cabal of his Adverfaries* will ufe all their Intereft at the Court of *Vienna* to divert his *Imperial Majefty* from acceding to the *Treaty*, are contained in the following Words. *It cannot certainly be expected that the fame Perfons who were fo much alarmed at the Negotiations, and*

*apprehended so many ill Consequences to Themselves from the Conclusion of a Provisional Treaty, should shew less Concern and Disappointment upon the News of a solid and lasting Peace; or should be less alert and active in their Endeavours to prevent its becoming general.*

This is equally candid with that Character, which He gives of *those Persons*, in the preceding Pages, and equally probable with the rest of his *Consequences*. How *solid and lasting* this Peace is like to be, We may judge from his own *Observations* on the *chief Articles* of it; but I must first take Notice that *Those Persons*, who cannot possibly reap any Advantage from the *highest Taxes*, must be very fond of parting with their Money, if They are less desirous of seeing them *diminish'd*, by a *solid and lasting Peace*, than some *other Persons*, who may heap up *farther Riches* by them.

I am well appriz'd, from *past Experience*, that even exposing the vile Sophistry of *this Pamphlet* may be called *furnishing the EMPEROR with Arguments against acceding to the Treaty and endeavouring to prevent its becoming general*. To this I shall only reply, once for all, that it is a *Topick* which may be equally urged, at any Time, against any *bad Measures* or *wicked Ministers* whatsoever; and therefore I am sure that the sensible Part of the World (who do not hold an *implicit Faith in Ministers*) will lay no Manner of Stress upon it, let it be repeated and echoed back upon us never so often or strongly by *this Gentleman* and his *Associates*.

Having made our Way thus far through the *Bil-  
lingsgate Rubbish* of his *Introduction*, We come to  
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the *Substance* and *Marrow* of his Book ; and here, perhaps, it will be said that He does not *fight against the Air* ; since He begins his *Observations with taking Notice of some false Insinuations, which these same wicked Persons have already let fall with Regard to this Treaty, which they could not, says He, at that Time have possibly seen and of the Contents of which they would persuade us, that the Directors of a Company, extremely interested in the Consequences of this Treaty, were equally ignorant ; though those Directors had seen and approved them.*

Can any Thing be more ridiculous than *this Paragraph*, which carries along with it a *full Answer* to the *Charge* it contains? For who could possibly apprehend that *these Directors had seen the Contents of the Treaty, at that Time ; or were not equally ignorant of them with all other Englishmen, who are equally interested, at least, in the Consequences of it ?* Who could imagine (till this *worthy Gentleman* was pleased to inform us of it) that the *Managers of a monied Corporation* should be more favoured than all the rest of his Majesty's *Landed and Trading Subjects* ; or even than the whole Body of the *Proprietors* of this Company itself, in *whose Name* They expressed their *Approbation* of it?

We all know in what *Manner* such Things are often carried ; and if it should appear that *this Obsequiousness to Ministerial Purposes* was drawn from them by the indirect Methods of any of their *Managers*, without having the *same Knowledge* communicated to them, We hope They will shew their *Resentment* of it at the ensuing Election of *Directors*, and not suffer themselves to be led by any  
Men,

*Men*, who make a Property of them upon every Occasion.

*It hath likewise been hinted*, quoth the *Observer*, that the securing of the Succession of Don Carlos in Italy, by Spanish Garrisons (which makes one of the principal Stipulations of the new Treaty) is a Step that may prove dangerous to the Peace of Europe; and that the Emperor, in particular, is obliged in Interest to prevent its taking Effect.

In the first Place, I appeal to the World who were the first that not only *hinted* but expatiated very largely on the *Danger*, which Europe had Reason to apprehend from the Prospects and growing Grandeur of *Don Carlos*? Did not the *Author of the Enquiry* begin it three Years ago; and was it not very strenuously insisted upon last Winter, by this very *Writer himself*, and, his *Advocates*, that *this Succession*, upon any Terms, was absolutely contrary to the Interest of all Europe and particularly to that of Great Britain? But since he hath now thought fit to alter his Note, for wise and steady Reasons, so far as even to affirm that instead of being contrary to the Interests of all Europe, there can be no solid Objection made to it; and since the Succession of Don Carlos in Italy is made one of the principal Stipulations in the new Treaty (as He, for once, very justly observes) I will give this Affair a particular Examination.

I shall not say any Thing, in this Place, concerning the Equity of disposing of *Dominions*, to which we cannot pretend any sort of *Right*; because it may seem ridiculous to turn *Moralist* and discuss

discuss a Point of *Casuistry*, where *Politicks* are concerned.

Besides, the *Observer* hath told us that whatever *Objections* might be made to *this Succession*, it is already *consented to* and *established by the Quadruple Alliance*; though if it should be allowed to be *bad* it self, I do not see how this will mend it, or that one *false Step* is any *Justification* of *another*; especially if it could be avoided; and I shall leave it to this *nice Distinguisher* to shew any Reason why we could not depart from *one Point* of the *Quadruple Alliance* as well as *another*; or whether indeed the *whole of it* is not vacated by this *Contravention*; especially as far as it relates to *Don Carlos*, and the *Emperor*.

However, I will consider this *Affair* in a *political View* only and as it relates to the *Quadruple Alliance*; by which it was stipulated that the *Duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Placentia*, in Case the *present Dukes* should dye without *Issue Male*, should descend to the *eldest Son* of her *Catholic Majesty* and his *Heirs Male*. It was likewise stipulated by *that Treaty* that *those Dominions* should never be in the Possession of *any Prince*, who shall at the same time be *K. of Spain*; that no *King of Spain* shall ever take upon Himself the *Guardianship* of *such Prince*; and farther that, during the *Lives* of the *present Possessors* of those *Dominions*, neither the *Emperor*, the *King of France*, the *King of Spain*, or the *Prince*, before nominated to *that Succession*, shall be permitted to introduce any *Troops* of their *own Nation*, or of any other *Nation* in *their Pay*, into *those Dominions*, nor to put any *Garrisons* into any of the *Towns*?

*Towns, Ports, Citadels or Fortresses* belonging to them; but that for securing this *eventual Succession*, upon the Demise of the *present Possessors*, the principal Places of those Dominions should be garrison'd with a Body of *Swiss Forces*, not exceeding *six thousand Men*, to be paid by *Germany, France and Great Britain* in equal Proportions; or that if the *Swiss Cantons* could not conveniently raise such a Number of Troops soon enough for that Service, His *Britannick Majesty* was to furnish them, with the Consent of the other contracting Parties, till the *Swiss Troops* could be raised and take Possession of those Places.

Whereas it is stipulated by the *present Treaty*, That the introducing of Garrisons into the Places of *Leghorn, Porto-terraio, Parma and Placentia*, to the Number of *six thousand Men* of his **CATHOLICK MAJESTY'S TROOPS**, and in his **PAY**, shall be **EFFECTUATED WITHOUT LOSS OF TIME**.

The *Observer* spends several Pages in justifying this Stipulation in Favour of *Don Carles*, and pronounces the Court of *Vienna* to be very ill advised, and very unjust or unreasonable, if they refuse to accede to the Treaty of *Seville* on Account of this Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance*, by the Introduction of *Spanish*, instead of *Swiss* Garrisons, into the fortified Places of *Tuscany and Parma*.

Though I am not one of *Those*, whom our great Author hath represented so averse to the general Tranquility of *Europe* as to suggest Arguments, which may prevent its taking Effect; yet I must beg Leave to express my own Ap-  
pre-

Apprehensions, that his *Imperial Majesty* may think it somewhat derogatory to his *Honour*, to permit the Succession to so *considerable a Fief of the Empire*, to be disposed of, not only without his *Consent*, and, in the Manner of it, contrary to a *solemn Treaty*, of which he was a *principal Party*; but likewise with an Air of *Triumph* over him, and, as an Expedient to dissolve an *Alliance* which hath been represented so *advantageous* to him.

His suffering himself to be disunited from so *beneficial an Alliance*, rather than come into *this Project*, is likewise an Argument to me, that he thought it contrary to his *Interest*.

But as this Introduction of *Spanish Troops* is to be EFFECTUATED *without Loss of Time*, let us consider how far this Variation from the *Quadruple Alliance* may affect *Great Britain*, and the *general Tranquillity of Europe*, proposed to be established by *this Treaty*.

I think it is allowed by *this Writer* and his *Advocates*, as well as others, that our present Circumstances require a *speedy and solid Peace*; but I am afraid it will be found, that *this Variation* is very far from tending to facilitate that good End; for however averle the *present Dukes of Tuscany and Parma*, and all the *Italian Princes*, might be to have their Dominions disposed of in this Manner, even after their *Death*; yet they might, perhaps, think fit quietly to submit to it, upon the Terms of the *Quadruple Alliance*, when they saw all the chief Powers of *Europe* concurring in a Resolution to that Purpose; but when *these Terms* are varied from *Neutral* to *Spanish Troops*, contrary to the Inclination of *one* of the contracting Parties, they will certainly endeavour to oppose it; and I confess *this Variation* does

not seem immaterial to *Them*, for the following Reasons ;

*First*, The present Dukes might think their *Persons* to be safer, whilst their Towns were garrison'd by Forces, which would not join in any Violence upon them, without the Concurrence of *three neutral Kings*, who had no Reason to be so impatient for the speedy Accession of *Don Carlos*, as their *Catholick Majesties* seem to be.

*Secondly*, *Neutral Garrisons* would certainly lie under a less Temptation to *meddle, directly or indirectly*, in Affairs of the Political, Oeconomical and Civil Government.

If therefore, for *these*, or any other Reasons, the present Possessors should refuse Admittance to the *Spanish Troops* ; and his *Imperial Majesty*, upon their Application, should think fit to assist them in it, either for *just* or *unjust* Reasons ; I leave the World to judge, whether *this Treaty* hath procured us that *only good End* of all our late tedious *Negotiations*, which we have so long desired, and hath been so often promised us ; I mean a *general* and *lasting Peace* ; for if we must be involved in a *War* ( as *this Writer* seems to prognosticate ) it matters but little with *what Prince* it begins ; and I must put him in Mind, that though a *Peace* with *Spain* may be more advantageous to a *Trading Nation* than a *Peace* with the *Emperor* ; yet a *War* with the *Emperor* would be, for the same Reason, more burthensome and impracticable to a *Maritime Power*, than a *War* with *Spain*.

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I have heard it often alledged in Conversation, that it is not in the Power of his *Imperial Majesty* to prevent the Execution of this *Treaty*; but this Allegation has been sufficiently confuted by the Author of the *Enquiry*, who told us, that the *Emperor alone was capable of disturbing it*, as well as by the Assertion of the *Writer* before us, who says, *That had that Succession been left open, all Italy, considering the Strength and Influence of those Dominions, which the Emperor hath already got Possession of in that Country, must in all Probability have fallen into his Hands; or at least into such Hands, as must have had an entire Dependance on him.* In another Place he says, *That the Emperor can be under no Apprehensions of Danger on this Head, having constantly in the Neighbourhood of those Garrisons, a Number of Troops more than sufficient to awe and check them, should they offer to exceed the Bounds prescribed them.*

My Inference from this is, That if his *Imperial Majesty* hath such an Influence in *Italy*, that he could have possess'd himself of these *Dutchies*, in opposition to all the *Italian Princes*, in case *this Succession had been left open*; or is even strong enough to awe and check these Troops, when put in possession of the *fortified Towns*; he may certainly give a great Opposition to their *Admittance*, when joined with the Wealth and Power of the *two Dukes*, and perhaps of some other *Italian Princes*; so that it is not now the only Question, *Whether this Variation will make that Engagement more effectual or not.* It is likewise a Question, *Whether such a Violence upon those Princes, as to put them and their Dominions under the Power of Spanish Troops, may not spirit up an Opposition to it.* If *neutral Troops* were to be put in Garrison, the Engagement would have been equally *effectual*; more

consistent, perhaps, with his *Imperial Majesty's* Honour; and, without Doubt, less disagreeable to the *present Possessors*.

The *Observer* advances another Argument in Defence of *this Variation*, which he seems to think an undeniable Reason for our consenting to it; and that is, *that it frees us from an Engagement we were before under, of paying one third Part of the Expence, which would have been requisite for maintaining neutral Garrisons in the Dutchies of Tuscany and Parma.*

I am glad to see any Appearances, in *this Gentleman*, of *frugal Designs*; but I doubt *This* may prove the Occasion of *much more Expence*; for if it should happen to be the Case, that *neutral Garrisons* might have been *amicably admitted*; and that *Spanish Troops* will be *opposed*, we may lie under a Necessity of maintaining *above seven times that Number of Men in Germany.*

And yet this *frugal Scheme* worked so strongly upon him, that he says *any Minister would have deserved the severest Punishment, who should have advised the King to have deferred, for one Month only, the Accommodation of our Differences with the Court of Spain, for the sake of THIS ALTERATION*; though it may be the Means of involving us in a *War*, instead of procuring us a *general and lasting Peace*; but I can easily see the Reason which might induce a *Minister* not to defer it, *for one Month only*; especially towards the *Conclusion of the Year.*

Thus stands the Case of *this Variation from the Quadruple Alliance*, with Regard to the *Emperor* and the present *Dukes of Tuscany and Parma.* Let us now consider how it stands with Relation to *Spain.*



By *this Treaty* we have stipulated not only to EFFECTUATE the Introduction of Spanish Troops, but likewise to establish *this Succession* and guaranty it, for ever, against any Opposition, in such Manner that thereby it may rest secure and exempt from all Events.

If therefore the Emperor, in Conjunction with the Italian Princes, or any other Powers, should think fit to oppose it, we cannot avoid entering into a War with Him and his Allies; and if we should happen to fail of Success by coercive Methods, after perhaps a great Number of expensive Campaigns, the Spaniards might complain of the Non-execution of the Treaty, in one of its most important Articles, and vacate the whole, upon plausible Allegations that however we might have attempted, we had not, according to the Tenor of the Treaty, EFFECTED the Introduction of Don Carlos into Italy.

It is likewise very observable that there is no Provision in *this Treaty*, as there was in the Quadruple Alliance, to prevent the Conjunction of these Dominions, upon any Contingency, with the Crown of Spain.

And here, I think, I have much better Grounds than the Author of the Enquiry had, to assert that there must be some secret Treaty, besides That which is made publick; for though it is stipulated that the Introduction of Spanish Troops into Italy, for securing the Succession of Don Carlos, shall be effectuated without Loss of Time; yet no Provision is made in what Manner, and at whose Expence, they are to be carried thither.

This is one Reason, amongst many others, which induces me to believe that there are some secret Articles not yet produced; especially, since we have lately heard Distinctions made by *this Gentleman*

tleman himself, between a *publick*, OSTENSIBLE Treaty (as He phrased it) and a *private Treaty*, kept in Reserve. This puts me in mind of the *exoterical* and *esoterical* Doctrines of the antient Philosophers; the former of which they propagated amongst the *Vulgar*, and kept the latter for *learned Men* only, and *private Conversation* amongst themselves. I am apt to believe that our *modern Statesmen* have built upon this Foundation, and borrowed their Method of Negotiating from the Principles of *these Phosophers*; since upon examining most of our *late Treaties*, we shall find very few, which are not restrained by some *private* or *esoterical Articles*.

Since therefore such liberal Concessions have been made to *Spain*, let us next enquire what Advantages are granted in Return to *Great Britain*, with regard to our *Trade* and *Possessions*, which have been under Dispute.

Our *Author* tells us, That all *former Treaties* and *Conventions* being confirmed by the *first Article*, we have a very full Acknowledgment, on the Part of *Spain*, of our Right to *Gibraltar* and the *Island of Minorca*; but as the Pretensions of the *Spaniards* to the former, have been founded on the Convention at *Madrid* in the Year 1721, some People may be apprehensive that they will renew that Claim, upon a proper Occasion, since *this Convention* is confirmed, as well as any other, by *that Article*.

We must therefore, in such a Case, rely upon the *second Article*, wherein the King of *Spain* guaranties all his Majesty's *Kingdoms*, *States* and *Dominions*; and I hope, with our *Author*, that *Gibraltar* is secured to us, under one of these *Denominations*, beyond all possibility of Doubt or Cavil; but I think I may safely accept of his *Defiance*, to shew

*in what manner they could be more effectually secured; which they most undoubtedly would have been, either by a specifick Renuntiation of all Right and Pretensions to them for the future; or, by using his own Terms, foreign Acquisitions or Possessions. I mention the Term Possessions, because our Ministers seemed to be sensible of the Comprehensiveness of it, by inserting it in the Treaty of Hanover; and the making use of it in the Articles of Seville, would have contained a full Acknowledgment of our Right to those Places; and if the Spaniards had a sincere Intention to confirm that Right, they would have suffered it to be expressed in Terms as clear as those in favour of Don Carlos. If they were not sincere, but had some Reserve, I am afraid that a different Construction of so important an Article will render the Peace less solid and lasting than the Observer promises, and every good Englishman hath Reason to wish.*

The other Point, which concerns us, relates to the re-establishment of our just Privileges in Commerce, and the Compensation due to our Merchants for their Sufferings during the Rupture; which are left to be settled by Commissaries of both Nations, who are to assemble at the Court of Spain, and to finish their Enquiries within the Space of three Years.

There seems to be some room for three Objections upon this Head.

*First, As to the Place; which some People may think would have been more properly fixed at London, where our Merchants, for whose Relief this Commission was principally intended, could with much less Trouble and Expence have produced the authentick Proofs and Vouchers for their Losses, and reply to any Objections that may be made to their Demands.*

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The next is with respect to the *Condition*, upon which this Compensation is to be made; and that is, *that the Ships, Merchandize and Effects shall not have been taken or seized upon account of unlawful Commerce, without specifying or explaining what shall be deem'd unlawful Commerce; which hath ever administred Matter of Dispute between the Spaniards and the English.*

The third Objection is to the *Length of Time* assigned to this *Enquiry*; which I find some Merchants apprehend may, in a great Measure, invalidate *that Stipulation*; for the *Spanish Ministers* cannot be ignorant of the *Italian Proverb, Chi guadagua Tempo, guadagua Toutto; He that gains Time, gains every Thing.*

These *Commissaries* are likewise to discuss and decide his *Catholick Majesty's* Pretensions to the Restitution of the Ships taken in the *Mediterranean*, in the Year 1718; an Article, which may be so cast up by *Spanish* Accomptants, as to overbalance the Account of the *British* Merchants, by *several Hundred Thousand Pounds.*

The *Observer* tells us, *That there was the less Pretence for declining this Discussion, because we were sure it would, upon Examination appear, that it was the Fault of the Spaniards only, that those Ships were not put into their Possession; from whence he would infer, that they cannot expect any Satisfaction for them; though he tells us himself, that at the Time those Ships were offer'd to be delivered at Port-Mahon, they were in such a decay'd Condition, that, upon the Refusal of the Spaniards to accept of them, they were, by the Order of the Governor, sunk in the main Sea. It is therefore reasonable to presume, that they will expect Reparation for them; or why should they have insisted on a Stipulation to that Purpose?*

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The *Observer* farther says, that the *Spaniards* found their Claim to *this Restitution* upon the *Treaty* of 1721; the *very same Treaty*, upon which they likewise found their Pretensions to *Gibraltar*; the *very same Treaty* which we concluded privately at *Madrid*, whilst we were *Mediators* between that Court and *Vienna*.

As *this Convention* therefore of 1721 (which, perhaps, it were to be wished had never been made) is confirmed by the *first Article* of the *present Treaty*, I do not see why the *Spaniards* may not insist upon the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, by Vertue of *this Treaty* (if there is any such *private Article* in it, as they alledge) as well as the Restitution of *Ships* taken in the *Mediterranean*; unless it be allow'd, that *this Article*, with Regard to the Case of *Gibraltar*, is *derogated from*, in the *second Article*, under the Words, *Kingdoms, States and Dominions*, which I hope will occasion no *future Dispute*.

I had almost forgot to take Notice of *one Article*, which I confess I was somewhat surprized to find in the *Treaty*, or at least express'd in *that manner*; I mean the *third*, where it is said, that the *MINISTERS* of his *Britannick*, and *Most Christian Majesties*, having *PRETENDED* (as it is in the *Original*) that the *Treaties* of *Vienna*, between his *Imperial Majesty* and the *King of Spain*, contain'd an *Infraction* of the *Treaties of Commerce*, antecedent to the Year 1725; his *Catholic Majesty* declares, as he had *before* declared, *That he never had any such MEANING*. I say, I was somewhat surprized to see an *Article* expressed in *this Manner*; because it may be construed into a Reflection on the *Understanding* or *Integrity* of *some Persons* of great Importance; and consider-

ng the *CORDIALITY* with which his Catho-  
 ick Majesty entered into this Treaty, I cannot  
 doubt that he would have suffered this Article to  
 be worded in *other Terms*.

Whether the *Treaty*, lately concluded at *Se-  
 ville*, be just, honourable and advantageous or  
 not; I must leave the World to judge whether  
 this *Observer* hath proved it to be so; but I am  
 very ready to agree with him in acknowledging  
 his Majesty's Goodness to us, and that the *Inte-  
 rests of Great Britain* hath the chief Place in his  
*Thoughts*.

I know very little of the Disputes between  
 his Majesty and the King of *Prussia*; but if that  
 Prince hath forcibly taken away any of his Ma-  
 jesty's *German* Subjects, he hath certainly a just  
 Right to *Reprisals*; as I think our *Merchants*  
 had for the *Ships* unlawfully taken from them by  
 the *Spaniards*.

Neither do I know of any *Britons*, who now  
 look upon the King of *Prussia* as their *Hero*,  
 and could not formerly prevail upon themselves  
 to treat him with common Decency; but I re-  
 member very well that some Men, who now set  
 him forth as a weak, inconsiderable Prince, repre-  
 sented him, about four Years ago, as a very potent  
 and profitable Ally.

I am as much at a Loss as this Author, to see  
 how it can be the Duty of any Englishman to encourage  
 Foreign Powers to invade the King's German Do-  
 minions, and to excite the Neighbouring Princes to  
 oppress a People, meerly because they acknowledge  
 the same Sovereign that we do. I scorn, as much  
 as he, to represent that Country barren and despi-  
 cable; though I cannot help thinking the *British*  
*Dominions* much more considerable, both to his  
 Majesty and us, and deserving the first Place in our  
*Thoughts*.

*Thoughts.* The former hath certainly the common Claim of all Protestant Nations to our Favour and good Wishes ; but how far we are obliged, under the Name of Protection, to engage our selves in a War upon that Account, I must leave to the Decision of the Act of Settlement, and to that Way of thinking upon it (as our Author expresses himself) in which the Parliament shall declare themselves to be.

I cannot conclude, without taking Notice of the Disingenuity of *this Writer*, in putting Cases and pressing Arguments of a very high and personal Nature, which cannot be answered without such a free Examination, as may be thought improper and disrespectful. The Words of the late Earl of Halifax, when Minister of State, upon a Subject of *this Kind*, are very candid and applicable to the present Occasion ; viz. *That it is not just to press an Argument, which puts another Man in Pain when he goes to answer it.*

But this hath been the constant mean Artifice of our Author and his Advocates. When we offer to argue with them, *Their Cause* is always the King's Cause, and *their Measures* must be the King's Measures ; which is sometimes true, in one Sense, as they are carried on by his Authority, and in his Name ; but I must beg Leave to insist upon it, that Ministers, by the Constitution of this Nation, are answerable for all *their Measures*, though transacted by the King's Authority ; and that they ought to be punished for bad Treaties, though concluded under His Royal Sanction.

I hope I have preserved a proper Decency of Language throughout these Sheets ; but if I should be thought to have let fall some Expressions with too much Warmth, they ought to be imputed to that

*Virulence*

*Virulence of Style and Manner*, with which our Author hath thought fit to treat *this Subject*.

When the Reader considers how very lately the *Treaty and Observations* were published, he will conclude, that *these Thoughts* upon them must be very *sudden*, and thrown together without any *Order or Method*. I need not therefore ask his *Indulgence* for any *Inaccuracies of Style*, or little *Mistakes*, as to the *Reasoning or Facts*, which I may have unwarily fallen into, and shall be ready to acknowledge upon *Conviction*.

I thought some *immediate Antidote* necessary to expel the *Poison*, which it was the *Design* of *this Pamphlet* to spread through the *Kingdom*. This was the *Occasion* of my writing in so much *Haste*; and I make no *Doubt* that the same *Subject* will be soon treated by a *much more able and masterly Hand*.

F I N I S.









